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Jackson: Constitutional Law - Commerical Speech: The Constitution - It's W

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Commercial Speech: The Constitution-It's What's for Dinner. United States v. United Foods,
Inc. 121 S. Ct. 2334 (2001).
INTRODUCTION

Celebrities wear milk mustaches in advertisements captioned
"Got Milk?" Beef is known to every American as "Beef-It's What's for
Dinner." One's grocery shopping is not complete without hearing the
jingle of "The Incredible, Edible Egg." These familiar advertisements
are among many marketing programs paid for by the producers of commodities through mandatory assessments. These programs collect about
$750 million each year to be used for the sole purpose of advertising.'
One such program involves the mushroom industry. In United States v.
United Foods, Inc., the United States Supreme Court considered a First
2
Amendment challenge to the generic mushroom advertising program.
United Foods, Inc. (United) is a large American mushroom producer located in Tennessee. 3 Due to unique characteristics of mushrooms, United Foods confines its distribution to three regional markets,
operating mushroom farms in Ventura, California (serving Southern
California and Arizona); Salem, Oregon (serving the Pacific Northwest);
and Fillmore, Utah (serving the central Rocky Mountain states). 4 Mushrooms have a low density, which causes them to bruise easily in transit. 56
Also, mushrooms spoil soon after harvesting so shipping is costly.

Therefore, United has located each of its mushroom farms in certain
strategic geographic areas. United competes with only a small number of
mushroom suppliers in each local market, which vary by geographic
location; thus, its marketing efforts are local rather than national. 7
1. David Savage & Nancy Brooks, Supreme Court Says Farmers Must Keep PayingforAds, LA TIMES, June 26, 1997, at D1.
2.
United States and Department of Agricultural v. United Foods, Inc., 121 S. Ct.
2334 (2001). This case challenges the fundamental premise of the New Deal agricultural

policy: the role of industry groups and collective action to increase overall earnings and
awareness.
3. Id. at 2337.
4. Brief for Respondent at 2, USDA v. United Foods, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 2334 (2001)
(No. 00-276) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
5.

Id.

6.

Id.
Id.

7.
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United markets its "Pictsweet" brand mushrooms over other
mushrooms by targeting certain grocers.' United assists in shelf-space
planning, subsidizes newspaper advertising, provides point-of-sale promotions, and conducts in-store demonstrations and tastings. 9 United considers this type of marketing essential, because a majority of the public
perceives mushrooms as a discretionary item, attractive only to certain
customers. °
In 1990, Congress passed the Mushroom Promotion, Research,
and Consumer Information Act, which established a Mushroom Council." This Council is authorized to order mushroom producers to pay an
assessment on the mushrooms they produce in an amount not to exceed
one cent per pound of mushrooms produced or imported.' 2 The assess-

ment is used primarily for generic, advertising to promote mushroom
sales. Congress deemed it in the public interest to implement such a
regulation to "strengthen the mushroom industry in the marketplace,
maintain and expand existing markets used for mushrooms, and to develop new markets and uses for mushrooms."' 3
4
In 1996, United refused to pay the mandatory assessment.'
United claimed the mandatory subsidy compelled it to finance speech in
violation of the First Amendment and filed a petition with the Secretary
of Agriculture.' 5 United argued it had the right to advertise its own
mushrooms as being superior to any other brand and should16 not be
forced to pay for advertising that supported all mushroom sales.

8. Id. at 3.
Id. United distinguishes its Pictsweet brand mushrooms and its service to retail9.
ers as superior to the competition. Id. In order for United to promote its Pictsweet brand
name, United coordinates with local grocers to encourage purchasing of United's mushrooms over other brands. Id.
Id. Based on United's considerable industry experience and research, concen10.
trated local marketing has been considered more beneficial due to the delicacy of mushrooms in transit as well as the public perception and consumption of mushrooms. Id.
11.
United, 121 S. Ct. 2334, 2337 (2001).
Id.
12.
7 U.S.C. § 6101(b)(1-3) (Law. Co-op. 2001).
13.
United, 121 S. Ct. at 2337.
14.
15.
Id. First, one files a petition with the appropriate administrative agency in
which an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) hears the case and delivers an opinion. Id.
Next, the Judicial Officer of the agency reviews the AJL decision and either affirms or
overrules the decision. Id. Finally, if the parties are unsatisfied with the decision they
can appeal to the appropriate United States District Court. Id. United paid approximately $100,000 annually under the Mushroom Promotion and Consumer Information
Order. Respondent's Brief, supra note 4, at 9.
16.
United,121 S. Ct. at 2338.
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The Agriculture Department then filed an action in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, seeking an
order forcing United to pay the assessment. 17 However, the action was
stayed pending a decision from the United States Supreme Court in
Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc.s In Glickman, the Supreme Court held that the regulations imposed upon California tree fruit
producers, a requirement that they pay a fee to finance generic advertising, did not violate the First Amendment.' 9
After Glickman was decided, an administrative law judge dismissed United's petition and the judicial officer of the Department of
Agriculture affirmed the decision.20 United then sought review in the
district court, where its suit was consolidated with the government's enforcement suit. 2' The district court held that Glickman was dispositive of
the First Amendment challenge and granted the government's motion for
summary judgment.22 United then appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which held that the United case was not
controlled by Glickman and reversed the district court's decision.23
The Supreme Court in United States v. United Foods, in a 6-3
split, affirmed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court and held that the
assessments violated the First Amendment.2 4 The Court found United to
be distinguishable from Glickman because in Glickman the assessments
used to finance commercial speech were found to be a small part of a
more comprehensive program restricting marketing autonomy. 25 In
United, the assessments were not a minor part of the regulation, but
rather were the whole point of the regulation.2 6 The Court held that
United had a First Amendment right to object to the assessments. 27
This case note discusses the history of cases dealing with commercial speech, compelled speech, and the mandatory funding of speech.
The note focuses on whether the Supreme Court correctly interpreted the
commercial speech doctrine in United by reviewing the Supreme Court's
varying and convoluted treatment of commercial speech. It then dis17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 2337.
Id.
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2142 (1997).
United, 121 S. Ct. at 2337.
Id.

22.
23.
24.

Id.

25.

Id. at 2340.

26.

Id.

27.

Id. at 2341.

Id.
Id. at 2341.
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cusses future implications of the application of the commercial speech
doctrine in the agriculture industry. This case note concludes that the
Supreme Court's decision in United misapplied well-reasoned precedents regarding the First Amendment and commercial speech, imposed a
new and unnecessary classification by differentiating between highly
versus lightly regulated industries for purposes of determining First
Amendment protection, and put in jeopardy $750 million in effective
generic advertising programs for agricultural commodities.
BACKGROUND

The Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act
In 1937, Congress enacted the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act (AMAA) as part of the New Deal. The AMAA allowed the
Secretary of Agriculture to "promulgate marketing orders for certain
fruits and vegetables in order to maintain orderly marketing conditions
and fair prices. 28 Marketing orders advance the policy of collective
rather than competitive marketing and ensure uniformity of policy and
pricing within the agricultural industry. 29 Congress has expressly authorized the establishment of projects "designed to assist, improve, or promote the marketing, distribution, and consumption ... of the commodity, through any form of marketing promotion including paid advertis30
ing. 99
In 1990, Congress enacted the Mushroom, Promotion, and Consumer Information Act (Mushroom Act), because Congress found that
"the maintenance and expansion of existing markets and uses [for mushrooms are] vital to the welfare of producers and those concerned with
marketing and using mushrooms, as well to the agricultural economy of
the Nation. ' , 3' The Mushroom Act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to order the establishment of a Mushroom Council and vests the
Secretary with authority to implement the statutory policy. 32 In particular, the Mushroom Council has authority "to develop and propose to the
Secretary voluntary quality and grade standards for mushrooms. 33 The
Mushroom Act provides that the activities of the Mushroom Council are
to be funded through assessments collected from producers and import28.
Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2134.
29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
Petitioner's Brief at 2, USDA v. United Foods, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 2334 (2001)
(No. 00-276) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
32.
Id.
33.

Id. at 4.
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ers of fresh mushrooms not to exceed one cent per pound of mush34

rooms.

Commercial Speech
Prior to 1976, the Supreme Court did not contemplate the notion
of "commercial speech. '" Advertising was not afforded any First
Amendment protection whatsoever because advertising restrictions were
seen as merely economic regulations. 36 In 1942, the Supreme Court delivered a precedent-setting decision in Valentine v. Chrestensen,where it
held advertising was not protected by the First Amendment. 3 The Court
upheld a New York ordinance forbidding street distribution of commercial handbills. 3' The Court found that the substance of Chrestensen's
printed protest amounted to an attempt to dodge the sanitary code and
upheld the prohibition of Chrestensen's activity in the streets. 39 The
Court declared that the issue of whether individuals should be allowed to
promote their business through handbill distribution was simply a matter
of legislative discretion.4
The Court found that commercial handbills were not protected
by the First Amendment because "the Constitution imposes no such restraint.",4 1 In a six-paragraph opinion, without citing any authority, the
Court stated, "We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no
such restraint on government as respects to purely commercial advertis34.

Id.

35. See Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. at 761. See also Sean P. Costello, Comment, Strange Brew: The State of
Commercial Speech Jurisprudence Before and After 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 47 CASE W. REs. L. Rv.681, 681 (1997). The Supreme Court first used the
phrase "commercial speech" in PittsburghPress Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384 (1973). According to Judge Alex Kozinski and Stuart
Banner, District of Columbia Judge Skelly Wright originated the expression in 1971.
Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial
Speech, 71 TEx. L. REv. 747, 756 (1993).
36.
See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (1949) (sustaining city advertising prohibition pursuant to economic substantive due process review);
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (upholding commercial handbill ordinance as proper government regulation of business).
37.
316 U.S. at 54.
38. Id. Mr. Chrestensen wanted to advertise his operation by distributing handbills
in the streets, but a New York Sanitary Code regulation prohibited such activity. Id.
Chrestensen printed a protest on one side of his handbill and attempted to circulate his
advertisements. Id. Upon the police stopping Christensen's efforts, Chrestensen filed a
suit charging that the sanitary regulation violated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 52-54.
39. Id. at 55.
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2002
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ing. 4 2 The Court primarily focused on the legitimate power of the government to regulate commerce.4 3
The Court's decision in Valentine-that commercial advertising
receives no Constitutional protection-engendered the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech and affected44 the Court's
treatment of commercial speech in the years that followed.
Over thirty years later in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the Court considered whether
the First Amendment protected an advertisement with a solely commercial purpose. 4' The Court found that there were "commonsense differences" between commercial speech and other kinds of speech.46 Among
those differences were that commercial speech was "more easily verifiable" and "more durable" than ordinary speech.47 However, the Court
still found that commercial speech was not "so far removed ... that it
lacked all protection., 48 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy recognized
for the first time limited protection for commercial speech. 49 The Court
did not indicate the extent of protection nor did it develop a test for determining First Amendment protection for commercial speech. 0
However, in 1980, the Supreme Court set forth a test to establish
consistency in commercial speech cases." In Central Hudson Gas &
Electric v. Public Service Commission, the New York Public Service

42.
43.

Id.at 54.
Id.at 54-55.

44.
REV.

Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA.
627, 628 (1990). Since Valentine, "the concept of a commercial/noncommercial

L.

distinction has remained in the law ...

by now it has become such a well-established

part of our jurisprudence that it is accepted almost without question." Id.
45.
425 U.S. 748. The Court phrased the specific issue as whether speech proposes
something more than a commercial transaction, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rela-

tions Comm 'n, 413 U.S. at 385, is so removed from any "exposition of ideas," Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), and from "truth, science, morality,
and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government," Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 479, 484 (1957), that it lacks all protection.
The Court's answer was that it was not. Id. at 761-762.
46.
Id. at 771 n.24.
47.
Id. These differences indicate that commercial speech is "hardier and retains
greater objectivity," thus it may not be necessary to afford commercial speech the same
protections as other speech. Id.
48.
Id. at 762.
49.
50.

Id. at 761-63.
Id.

51.
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol2/iss2/10
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Commission prohibited, by regulation, an electric utility company from
advertising to promote the use of electricity. 52 The state asserted that its
interest in energy conservation and the minimization of costs to prevent
general rate increases was reason enough to prevent the utility's commercial speech.53 The Court held that a ban prohibiting advertising was
unconstitutional because it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 54 In deciding Central Hudson, the Court outlined a four-part test
in order to determine whether regulation of commercial speech violated
the First Amendment.5 5
The Court made clear that such restrictions are subject to intermediate scrutiny, holding that commercial speech embodies a lesser protection than traditionally protected speech, such as ideological or political speech.56 The Court's four-part test was: (1) The commercial speech
in question cannot be "misleading or related to unlawful activity;" (2)
there must be a substantial government interest in regulating the speech;
(3) the restriction must be proportional to the interest advanced; and (4)
the restriction is "carefully designed to achieve the state's goal. 57 Applying this test, the Court held that the Public Service Commission's
advertising ban violated the First Amendment.58
The Court recognized the substantial state interest but held that
the restriction on all promotional advertising, regardless of its impact on
overall energy use, did not directly advance the government's interest in
maintaining its rate structure. 59 The Court also held that the regulation
was overly restrictive because the state interest could adequately be
served by a more limited restriction on the content of promotional advertising. 60 The CentralHudson test has become the standard by which the
applicability of the First Amendment to commercial speech is measured.6'
However, despite the clear test applied in Central Hudson, the
subsequent decisions regarding commercial speech have been convoluted. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co., the Court
reviewed a Puerto Rican statute allowing casinos to advertise in publicaId. at 558-61.
Id. at 566-72.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 563-66.
Id.
57.
Id.The test is often referred to as the three-pronged test, using just the last three
elements.
58.
Id.at 572.
59.
Id.at 569-70.
60. Id.at 569-71.
61.
44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 518 (1996).
52.

53.
54.
55.
56.
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tions aimed at tourists but not in publications aimed at Puerto Rican
residents. 62 The Court found that the state had a substantial interest in
reducing gambling among its residents. 63 The Court analyzed and found
that the State's interest, "basically involves a consideration of the fit
between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those
ends." 64 The Court found that the Legislature's conclusion that the statute would advance that interest was a reasonable one. 65 Then the Court
left the fourth prong of the Central Hudson analysis for the Legislature
to determine.66 The Court took a paternalistic stance and stated that "the
greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes
the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling., 67
Nine years after the Posadas decision, the Supreme Court again
applied the Central Hudson analysis in Board of Trustees v. Fox.6 The
Fox Court stated that the requirement of the fourth prong of the Central
Hudson test, that the means used to achieve the state's interest be no
more extensive than necessary, was not the same as the least-restrictivealternative requirement of strict scrutiny. 69 The connection between the
restriction on speech and the interest furthered by the restriction did not
have to be a "perfect" one but only a "reasonable" one. 70
The Court again applied a heightened scrutiny in Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co. 71 The Court held that a federal statute prohibiting beer
manufacturers from displaying alcohol content on labels violated the
First Amendment. 72 The Court stated that the government's interest
62.
63.

478 U.S. 328, 340-41 (1986).
Id. at 341.
64.
Id.
65.
Id. at 342.
66.
Id. at 344. The Court stated that "it is up to the legislature to decide whether or
not [an alternate] policy would be as effective in reducing the demand for casino gambling as a restriction on advertising." Id.
67.
Id. at 345-46.
68.
492 U.S. 469 (1989). In Fox, students of the State University of New York held
a Tupperware party in violation of a school resolution that forbade commercial enterprises to operate on campus. Id. at 471-72. The government asserted the resolution furthered its interest in "promoting an educational rather than commercial atmosphere on..
. campuses." Id. at 475. The students claimed that the resolution violated their right to
free speech and that the Tupperware party involved both commercial and "pure speech"
about fiscal responsibility and operating an efficient household. Id. at 474. The Court
rejected the theory that the speech at issue was partially pure speech and decided the
case under CentralHudson standards. Id. at 474-75.
69.
Id.at 480.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
514 U.S. 476, 486-89 (1995).

Id. at 490-91. The Court concluded that the Government's interest in preserving

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol2/iss2/10
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would not directly be advanced by the restrictions,
73 and if anything, those

restrictions counteract the government's interest.

In 1996, the Supreme Court decided 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, in which 44 Liquormart was fined for placing an advertisement that violated a Rhode Island law prohibiting the advertising of
liquor prices. 74 The Court's majority found that the Twenty-first
Amendment did not preclude the First Amendment from applying to the

statute in question; thus, all of the Justices agreed that the liquor price
advertising ban was unconstitutional. 75 However, the members of the
Court disagreed about the continuing validity of Central Hudson and
Posadas.76 The split in the Court over the applicability and continuing

use of the Central Hudson test is observed in the many commercial
speech cases decided post-Posadas.

Compelled Speech
The Supreme Court has held that the government cannot compel
an individual to speak, as compelled speech is also a violation of the
First Amendment. 77 In West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, the Supreme Court reviewed a state law that compelled a

young school child to recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag, a pledge
that conflicted with her parents' religious beliefs.7 ' The Court held that

this act violated the First Amendment by stating, "if there is any fixed
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty
state authority is not sufficiently substantial to meet the requirements of Central Hudson. Id.
73.
Id. at 489. The government asserted that its substantial interest was in protecting the general welfare of the public by preventing competition wars on the basis of the
strength of the alcohol. Id. at 487-89.
74.
517 U.S. at 492-93. 44 Liquormart placed an advertisement that did not specifically mention the prices, had the word "WOW" next to the pictures of liquor bottles. Id.
The Rhode Island Liquor Control Administrator found that the advertisement implied a
reference to liquor prices and therefore violated the law prohibiting the advertisement of
liquor prices. Id.
75.
Id. at 516. The Twenty-first Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amendment
and allowed the states to prohibit interstate commerce in alcoholic beverages. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XXI. The Court stated "although the Twenty-first Amendment limits the
effect of the dormant Commerce Clause on a State's regulatory power over the delivery
or use of intoxicating beverages within its borders, "the Amendment does not license
the states to ignore their obligations under other provisions of the Constitution." 44
Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 516 (quoting Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691,
712 (1984)).
76.
Id.
77.
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977).
78.
319 U.S. 624, 626-29 (1943).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2002

9

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 2 [2002], No. 2, Art. 10

626

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 2

can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein. 7 9
Later, in Wooley v. Maynard, the Court considered whether a
New Hampshire prohibition against covering up the State's motto on
license plates, "Live Free or Die," violated the First Amendment. 0 This
prohibition addressed the issue of whether the State could require a person to display a political message on private property." The Court held
that the First Amendment protects "both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all."8'2 The Court found that the State's
interests in promoting history and state pride were not compelling
enough to outweigh individual rights. 3 This is a vital case in First
Amendment jurisprudence as it formalizes the notion that
the govern84
speech.
limit
cannot
it
as
just
speech,
compel
cannot
ment
While the state may not require a person to speak, the Court
found in PruneyardShopping Center v. Robins that one may be required
to allow others to speak under some circumstances. 5 The Court upheld
an interpretation of the California Constitution that required a private
shopping mall owner to allow others to reasonably exercise their free
speech rights on the premises.8 6 The Court found that the shopping mall
was not devoted to the exclusive use of the owner and therefore the message of the pamphleteers would not likely be identified as the owner's
own.8 7 Second, because the government dictated only access and did not
select any particular message to be expressed, there was no danger of
government viewpoint discrimination or self-censorship of the mall
owner.8 8 Third, the mall owner could expressly disavow any connection
with the content of the message.89
Although Pruneyard established that in narrow situations one
may be required to allow another to speak, that will not be the case when

79.
Id. at 642.
80. 430 U.S. at 706. Maynard was a Jehovah Witness who found the slogan to be
offensive and deeply at odds with his religious convictions. Id. at 707.
81.
Id. at 713.
82.
Id. at 714.
83.
Id. at 716-17.
84.
Id. at 713.
85.
447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
86.
Id. at 88.
87.
Id.
88. Id. at 87.
89.
Id. at 88.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol2/iss2/10
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doing so would force one to respond to the specific speech. 90 In Pacific
Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, a plurality of the
Court invalidated an order requiring the utility to share the extra space in
its billing envelopes with an organization that opposed its viewpoint. 9'
The requirement to include flyers that were critical of the utility company forced the utility company to respond to what the flyers had said,
and "that kind of forced response is antithetical to the free discussion the
First Amendment seeks to foster., 92 The Court stated that "for corporations as for individuals, the choice to speak includes within it the choice
of what not to say." 93 The "message itself is protected" as part of the
First Amendment's protection of the free flow of ideas.94
Later cases emphasized the importance of the right to remain silent. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of
Boston, the Supreme Court reviewed a Massachusetts public accommodation law to compel the veterans group authorized to organize South
Boston's annual St. Patrick's Day Parade to admit a gay, lesbian, and
bisexual group in the parade as marchers. 95 The Court found that the
group sponsoring a parade was not required to include another group in
the parade when it disagreed with the other group's message.96 Unlike
the situation in Pruneyard,parade observers would interpret the message
of each group marching in the parade as part of the overall theme of the
parade and that was enough to uphold97the decision to exclude a particular group under the First Amendment.
MandatoryFunding of Speech
Among the cases involving compelled speech the Supreme Court
has also heard cases involving the government ordering individuals to
finance speech. In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, a teachers' union had a collective bargaining agreement which maintained a provision
that the school district would be an "agency shop," so that any teacher
who refused to join the union was required to pay a "service charge

90.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comim'n., 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986). In
most cases there is no First Amendment right to use private property for speech purposes. See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Private Property,Public Property: Shopping Centers and Expressive Freedom in the States, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1229, 1234 (1999).
91.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 20-21.
92.
Id.at 16.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
95. 515 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1995).
96.
Id. at 570.
97.
Id. at 576-77.
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equal to the regular dues" paid by union members.98 The Supreme Court
found that requiring the union to represent all employees did not violate
the Constitution." However, some of the money the employees were
required to contribute was spent on political and ideological matters unrelated to collective bargaining, and the Court held this did violate the
First Amendment.'0° The fact that the employees were "compelled to
make, rather than prohibited from making, contributions for political
purposes was no less an infringement of their constitutional rights."' '
Thus, while the Court found no violation with the teachers being required to pay union dues, the fact that the dues were spent for political
purposes unrelated to the union made the mandatory funding unconstitutional. 0 2
The Court in Abood provided guidelines to determine when employees could be required to fund expressive union activity; it held that
the expression must be germane to the union's purpose and the funding
03
requirement must also be justified by vital policy interests.
In Glickman v. Wileman Brothers. & Elliott, Inc., the Supreme
Court decided whether the First Amendment is violated where government regulations require that a certain group pay for generic advertising.' 4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Glickman to resolve a
conflict between the Ninth Circuit, which decided Glickman, and the
Third Circuit, which decided United States v. Frame.0 5 In Frame, the
Third Circuit held the Beef Promotion and Research Act implicates the
First Amendment by applying the CentralHudson test. The Third Circuit
held that the state's interest was neutral, compelling, and drafted in a
way that did not infringe on the contributors' rights. 0 6 The Supreme
Court held that marketing orders for peaches, plums, and nectarines,
which required producers to finance generic advertising through mandatory assessments, were not regulations that raised First Amendment issues. The majority found that the marketing regulations imposed no re98.

431 U.S. 209 (1977). An agency shop agreement is an arrangement between the

union and the local government where all employees, as a condition of employment,
must pay a service fee equal to the amount of union dues, regardless of whether they are

a union member or not. Id. at 211.
99.

Id. at 241-42.

100.

Id. at 234.

I01.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 209.
117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997). The group consisted of California peach, plum, and

102.

103.
104.

nectarine producers.
105.
106.

885 F.2d 1119 (1989).

Id. at 1137.
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striction on producers from doing their own advertising or separately
displaying their own message, and that the regulations do not compel the
producers to engage in actual or symbolic speech since they 0do
not order
7
the producers to finance any ideological or political speech.1
PRINCIPAL CASE

In United States v. United Foods, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court
framed the issue as "whether the government may underwrite and sponsor speech with a certain viewpoint using special subsidies exacted from
a designated class of persons, some of whom object to the idea being
advanced."' 0'
In United, the Supreme Court held that a government assessment
on mushroom handlers to fund generic advertising to promote mushroom
sales violated the First Amendment.' °9 The Court found that the First
Amendment not only protects speech, but also prevents the government
from forcing individuals from expressing certain views." 0
The Court in United distinguished this case from Glickman in
several ways. First, the assessments in Glickman embodied mandated
assessments for speech, which were a small part of a more comprehensive program restricting marketing autonomy." In United, the mandatory funding for speech was not a minor part of the regulation, but rather
the main point of the regulation, because the advertisements were not
ancillary to a more comprehensive program. In other words, 2the speech
was the principle object of the regulatory scheme in United. 1
Second, the detailed marketing orders in Glickman displaced
competition to such an extent that the producers were "expressly exempted from the antitrust laws.' 3 The tree fruit marketing program was
characterized by "collective action, rather than the aggregate consequences of independent competitive choices." '" 4 Thus, the producers
who were compelled to contribute funds toward generic advertising "did
107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.

Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2138.
United, 121 S. Ct. at 2338.

Id. at 2341.
Id. at 2338 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)).
Id. at 2339.

Id.

Id. Marketing orders promulgated pursuant to the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act (AMAA) are a type of economic regulation which have displaced competition in a number of discrete markets and are expressly exempted from antitrust laws
§ 608(b). Glickman, 117 S. Ct. at 2134.
114.
United, 121 S. Ct. at 2339.
113.
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so as a part of a broader collective enterprise in which their freedom to
act independently was already constrained by the regulatory scheme."' 15
In United, nearly all of the assessments went toward generic advertising.
"Beyond the collection and disbursement of advertising funds, there are
no marketing orders that regulate how mushrooms are to be produced
and sold, no exemption from the antitrust laws, and nothing preventing
16
individual producers from making their own marketing decisions."'
Third, unlike the California tree fruit producers in Glickman, the
mushroom producers in United were not compelled to belong to an association of growers to make cooperative decisions." 7 The Glickman Court
stressed "the importance of the statutory context in which it arises;"
thus, the complete regulatory program must be considered when analyzing the case."'
The Court found that Glickman and United are similar in that the
"assessments do not prohibit a party from communicating its own message, the program does not compel an objecting party itself to express
views it disfavors, and the mandated scheme does not compel the expression of political or ideological views."" 9 However, the Court distinguished the principles set forth in Glickman from United by stressing
20
that the regulatory scheme in Glickman differed in a fundamental way.'
In Glickman, the assessments for speech were ancillary to a more comprehensive regulatory program, and in United, the entire program is in
place to obtain assessments to fund generic advertising.' 2 ' The Court
stressed that the entire regulatory program must be considered in resolving a case.1
The Supreme Court concluded "mandatory support is contrary to
the First Amendment principles set forth in cases involving expression
by groups which include persons who object to speech, but who,23nevertheless, must remain members of the group by law or necessity."'
The Court's analysis ends with an extension of the Abood rule,
which "recognized a First Amendment interest in not being compelled to

115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Glickman, 117 S. Ct. 2138).

119.

Id. at 2338.

120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id. at 2338-39.
Id. at 2339.
Id.
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contribute to an organization whose expressive activities conflict with
one's freedom of belief.', 124 The Court emphasized that courts must inquire into "whether there is some state-imposed obligation which makes
group membership less than voluntary; for it is the only overriding associational purpose which allows any compelled subsidy for speech in the
first place.' 21 In United, mushroom producers are forced to loosely associate only in order to contribute monies126to fund a generic advertising
scheme, not a broader regulatory scheme.
Thus, the Court held that United had a First Amendment right to
object to the assessments and to buy its own127advertising supporting a
message that its own mushrooms are superior.
Justice Stevens' ConcurringOpinion
Justice Stevens agreed with the dissent that the program at issue
in United, as in Glickman, "does not compel speech itself; it compels the
payment of money.' 28 He went on to note "this fact alone suffices to
distinguish compelled subsidies cases from the compelled speech in
cases like West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette and Maynard v.
Wooley.' 129 He stated that compelled subsidies are permissible only
when ancillary to a larger cooperative scheme. 3a Justice Stevens agreed
with the majority that one who has "surrendered a far greater liberty to
the collective entity (either voluntary or by permissible compulsion)
does not raise a significant constitutional issue if it is ancillary to the
main purpose of the collective program.'' Stevens stressed that the
First Amendment is implicated when a person is forced to subsidize
speech to which he objects and the speech is not ancillary to a valid
comprehensive program. 3 2 Thus, he found the outcome proper in that
the mandatory assessments in this case violate the First Amendment because of the restraint on liberty that "government compulsion to finance
objectionable speech imposes.' 3 3

124.
125.

Id. (citing Abood, 431 U.S. at 235).

126.

Id. at 2340-41.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 2341.
Id. at 2342. (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).

United, 121 S.Ct. at 2340.
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Justice Thomas 's ConcurringOpinion
Justice Thomas wrote separately to emphasize his view that
commercial speech should be held to the same level of heightened scrutiny as non-commercial speech. 13 4 Justice Thomas reiterated his view
that "paying money for the purposes of advertising involves speech and
that compelling speech raises a First Amendment issue just as much as
restricting speech."' 35 He expressed his strong opinion that compelled
funding of advertising should be evaluated under strict First Amendment
scrutiny. 116
Justice Breyer's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice O'Connor,
dissented in United. Justice Breyer wrote, "The Court disregards controlling precedent, fails to properly analyze the strength of the relevant regulatory and commercial speech interests, and introduces into First
Amendment law an unreasoned legal principle that may well pose an
obstacle
to the development of beneficial forms of economic regula1 37
tion."'
The dissent maintained that United was very similar to Glickman
because both cases sought to resolve the same issue: "Whether the First
Amendment prohibits the government from collecting a fee for collective product advertising from an objecting producer.'13 Just four years
earlier, the Glickman Court reasoned that the collection of the fee did not
"raise a First Amendment issue" for the Court to resolve, but rather was
"simply a question of economic policy for Congress and the Executive to
resolve."'3 Like the California tree fruit producers, the mushroom handlers are not prohibited from communicating a different message, nor
does the Act require the handlers to engage in actual or symbolic speech,
and the Act does not compel the handlers to finance political or ideological speech. 40 Justice Breyer indicated that the "similar characteristics of the cases demand a similar conclusion.' 4' The Court distinguished United from Glickman by stressing the difference in regulatory
schemes. However, Justice Breyer noted, "It is difficult to see why a
134.

Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).

135.

Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).

136.
137.

Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 2342. (Breyer, J., dissenting).

138.

Id. at 2343. (Breyer, J., dissenting).

139.
140.
141.

Id. at 2342-43. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2343. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Constitution that seeks to protect individual freedom would consider the
absence of heavy regulation, to amount to a special, determinative
rea142
program.',
intrusive
less
this
permit
to
refusing
son for
The dissent stressed that this regulatory program is a "species of
economic regulation which does not warrant special First Amendment
scrutiny.' 43 This program does not interfere with protected speech interests, because it does not compel speech but rather compels the payment
of money.' 44 It also does not hinder the basic First Amendment "commercial speech" objective as it promotes truthful information to customers. 45 The speech involved deals with truthful product promotion and
does not bind mushroom handlers from any speech or expression. 46 The
Court has deemed that the First Amendment's objective when dealing
with commercial speech is to protect the consumer from misleading
47 Finally, there is no special risk of harming other
product information.
148
forms of speech.
Justice Breyer furthered his argument by analyzing the case with
the Central Hudson test, thus demonstrating that even if he found this
type of compelled assessment to be "commercial speech" he would still
find no First Amendment violation.1 49 The dissent found that (1) the
government's interest is substantial; and (2) compelled monetary contributions are necessary and proportionate to legitimate promotional goals
that it seeks, as the volunteer program did not work and there is proof
that advertising increases sales of mushrooms.' 50 The dissent insisted
that the Court erroneously
turned an economic policy into a First
151
issue.
Amendment
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's decision in United further confused the alId. at 2344. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2346. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). "Money and speech are not identical." Id. (citing
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388-389). "Money is property, it is not speech." Id. at 400. The government can support programs and policies
through taxes even upon objecting parties. Id. at 2371 (citing Southworth v. Grebe, 529
U.S. at 241).
145.
United, 121 S.Ct. at 2346. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
146.
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
147.
Id. at 2346-47. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
148.
Id. at 2347. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
149.
Id. at 2348. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
150.
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
151.
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
142.
143.
144.
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ready convoluted legal doctrine of commercial speech and the protection
it should be afforded by the Constitution. Throughout the history of
commercial speech, the Supreme Court has held that it is afforded a different level of protection than political or ideological speech. 152 Until the
1970s the Court did not grant commercial speech any constitutional protection at all. 5 3 The Court in United took an unprecedented step off the
constitutional plank by providing mushroom producers a level of First
Amendment protection never previously granted. The Supreme Court
determined that a mandatory assessment
imposed upon agricultural in54
dustries violates the First Amendment.
ConstitutionalScrutiny of Commercial Speech: The CentralHudson Test
The Court ignored the existing legal precedent by failing to apply the workable test outlined in Central Hudson. The Court stated that
it failed to engage in a Central Hudson analysis due to the fact that the
government did not challenge the court of appeals decision based on
such an issue. 55 Thus, the Court did not consider whether the government's interest was substantial under the Central Hudson test. 56 However, if the Court had engaged in a Central Hudson analysis, this case
may have had a very different result.
The Supreme Court has applied the Central Hudson test inconsistently, making it difficult to predict when restrictions on commercial
speech would be allowed and when they would violate the First
Amendment.
Justice Breyer, in dissent, analyzed the case under the Central
Hudson test and determined that the regulatory scheme at issue did not
Violate the First Amendment. 157 The speech at issue was plainly not misleading or related to unlawful activity. 5 ' By examining the Mushroom
Act and the legislative findings, a substantial government interest is established. 59 The legislative findings noted that mushrooms are a "valuable part of the human diet," per capita mushroom consumption in Canada was twice that of the United States, and promotion of mushrooms in
this country may help to conquer inaccurate perceptions about the prod152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See supra, note 42, and accompanying text.
Virginia State Bd. ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. 748.
United, 121 S. Ct. at 2341.
Id. at 2348. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2337-38.
Id. at 2348. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2341.
Id. at 2347. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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uct by overcoming consumer fears about the safety of eating mush6
rooms.1
Several features of the program indicate that its compelled assessments are necessary and proportionate to the goals that the government seeks.' 61 At the legislative hearings, industry representatives made
it clear that previous voluntary contributions had failed miserably as
many producers would not pay for the advertising yet would benefit,
thus many would take a "free-ride" on the expenditures of others. 62 The
final prong of the Central Hudson test was also satisfied because the
Mushroom Act was carefully designed to achieve the state's goal.
The law was not over-inclusive, as it pertained only to mushroom producers and no other agricultural entity and was not underinclusive because it was applied to both foreign and domestic mushroom
handlers alike.' 63 The effect of the mushroom advertising has provided
empirical evidence demonstrating the program's effectiveness)6 The
Mushroom Council Program Effectiveness found that for "every million
dollars spent by the Mushroom Council ...the growth rate of mushroom
sales increased by 2.1%.99165
The Supreme Court's holding in this case is inconsistent with
previous First Amendment cases or precedent. Although the Court has
consistently afforded commercial speech less protection than noncommercial speech, in United, the Court struck down a statute even
though it passed constitutional muster under the Central Hudson test.
The United Court not only created more confusion in the commercial
speech arena, but also failed to set guidelines or create a new workable
test to determine which mandatory assessment programs should be protected under the First Amendment. The Court alluded to Posadas'
"greater-power-includes-the-lesser" dictum. '6 However, Posadas has
been described as the "low water mark" for commercial speech because
the Court applied Central Hudson's prongs in such a 67way as to provide
significant deference to state advertising restrictions.

160.
161.
162.

Id. at 2344. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).

163.

Id. at 2348. (Breyer, J., dissenting).

164.
165.

Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
166.
Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A
Separability Approach, 43 UCLA L. REV. 371, 386 n.76 (1995).
167.
Cameron De Vore, The Two Faces of Commercial Speech under the First
Amendment, 12 CoMM. LAW. Spring 1994, at 23 (1994).
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Similaritiesof Glickman and United
The fact pattern and legal issues in United are nearly identical to
those in Glickman, and similar cases demand similar conclusions unless
the previous case was deemed bad law. The United court did not overrule Glickman but rather distinguished the case in a simplistic and illogi1 68
cal manner.
The Supreme Court erred in distinguishing this case from Glickman on the ground that mushroom producers are not as heavily regulated
as the California tree fruit producers. 69 This rationale concludes that
once an industry is deemed to be "heavily regulated," First Amendment
protections are greatly limited.170 However, the differences in regulation
have not been critical in previous cases. 171 First, the Glickman Court
referred to the fact that Congress had "authorized" extensive regulation
of the industry. 72 However, "some of the marketing orders, price and
out-put regulations, while authorized were not, in fact, in place.' 73 In
United, just as in Glickman, the Secretary of Agriculture is "authorized"
to promulgate price and supply regulations. Thus the level of regulation
74
would not appear to be a critical factor in First Amendment protection.
The United Court fails to explain or rationalize why producers in a more
comprehensively
regulated industry are afforded lesser First Amendment
75
protection.
Also, the Supreme Court's First Amendment analysis in Glickman is not premised upon the amount of regulation. 76 Rather, the only
discussion of industry regulation in Glickman was set forth in a section
in which the Court merely defined the scope of the controversy. 177 The
discussion of industry regulation is not referenced or relied upon as part
of the First Amendment analysis. 78 "If the Court had intended its decision in Glickman to turn on the extent of regulation of the industry at
168.

United, 121 S. Ct. at 2338-41.

169.

Petitioner's Brief, supra note 31, at 12.

170.
In order to decipher if an industry is highly or lightly regulated the Court appears to look at several factors, which include: legislative purpose in implementing the
marketing orders, the character of the industry, and the relative expenditures involved in
generic advertising campaigns versus other expenditures under the program.
171.
United, 121 S Ct. at 2343. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.

176.

Petitioner's Brief, supra note 31, at 12.
Id. at 21.

177.
178.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 22.
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issue, the Court would not merely have stated as a fact that the tree fruit
industries were regulated in other respects, but would have also ex79
plained the significance of that fact to its First Amendment holding.'
It is also significant to note that the reason the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Glickman was to resolve a conflict between the
Ninth Circuit, which decided Glickman, and Third Circuit, which decided United States v. Frame.'80 The Court did not draw any distinctions
of constitutional significance between the regulatory schemes in Glickman and Frame."' If the Court's decision in Glickman was limited to
generic advertising programs imposed under comprehensive marketing
orders for a highly regulated commodity, "then the Court presumably
would have said so, having granted
certiorari to resolve the conflict be82
tween Glickman and Frame.'9
"The purpose of generic advertising programs is the same
whether the program stands alone, as here, or is part of a more comprehensive regulatory scheme as in Glickman." ' 3 In either situation, "the
purpose is to maintain and expand the market for an agricultural commodity, to the benefit of the producers and processors of the commodity
and, ultimately, of the Nation's agricultural economy as a whole.""'
This case should not have been distinguished from Glickman.
For the same three reasons that the Court identified with respect to the
generic advertising program in Glickman, the generic advertising program for mushrooms is unlike laws that have been held to violate the
First Amendment.8 5 Like Glickman, this case "imposes no restraint on
the freedom of any producer to communicate any message to any audience;" it "does not compel any person to engage in any actual or symbolic speech;" and it "does not compel the producers to endorse or finance any political or ideological views.' 8 6 Like the California tree fruit
producers, mushroom producers are simply required to share the costs of

179.

Id.

180.

Id. at 23. See United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119 (1989). This case involved

a First Amendment challenge to a generic advertising program pursuant to the Beef
Promotion and Research Act of 1985. Id. at 1121. Unlike in Glickman, this Act does not
extensively regulate the beef industry. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 31, at 23-24.
181.
Id. at 24.
182.
183.

184.

Id.

Id. at 25.
Id.

185.
Id. at 11.
186.
Id. (citing Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 469-70
(1997)).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2002

21

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 2 [2002], No. 2, Art. 10
WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 2

promotional activities that are non-ideological and "unquestionably germane to the purposes."' 7
The Implications of the United Decision
Because the Court in United distinguished Glickman, it created a
new line of precedent in commercial mandatory funding cases. This decision leaves the agricultural industries' mandatory check-off programs
in confusion. 8' Now, without judicial interpretation, it will be difficult
for Congress to develop a regulatory program that promotes a specific
agricultural commodity that does not violate the First Amendment. Congress will ironically be forced to develop stricter regulatory schemes to
achieve industry marketing goals without prompting First Amendment
challenges. 8 9
Congress and the Department of Agriculture will have a very difficult time implementing these vital mandatory check-off programs
without disrupting the agricultural economy and violating the First
Amendment. In light of United, marketing programs and orders will be
built upon more intrusive regulatory schemes than necessary to meet the
needs and desires of producers to increase the demand for their commodities.
The ramifications of the decision in United are extraordinary,
because the agricultural industry relies heavily on mandatory check-off
programs, which have proven to benefit various agricultural commodities sales tremendously. Generic commercial slogans are easily recognized and resonate throughout the American economy. Slogans like "The
Incredible, Edible Egg," "Ahi... the Power of Cheese," or "The Touch.
. .the Feel of Cotton... the Fabric of Our Lives" are common advertisements that ring of familiarity.' 90 Millions of dollars are tied up in
generic advertising for agricultural commodities and the effects on the
industry are positive. The beef industry advertises: "Beef-It's what's
for Dinner," and mandates beef producers to pay one dollar per head of
Id. (citing Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 473
187.
(1997)). Unlike the union cases where the real issue was whether the speech was tied to
the fundamental purpose of the union, what is at issue here is the point of collective
action. For example, it's fine for the government to impose supply-limiting regulations
that destroy a portion of a farmer's crop however, to tax the same portion of this crop
for generic advertising to increase demand is now considered suspect.
188.
Has the Supreme Court Killed Checkoffs? Case of the Mushrooms and Free
Speech, SUCCESSFUL FARMING, August 1, 2001, at 48.

189.

United, 121 S.Ct. at 2346. (Breyer, J., dissenting).

190.

1998 AGRICULTURE FACT BOOK, Marketing and Regulatory Programs, avail-

able at http://usda.gov/news/pubs/fbook98/chl2a.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2001).
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cattle.' 9' The beef check-off program has had an incredibly positive effect on the beef industry.' 92 The check-off program has not only "halted
a 20-year beef demand erosion, but has also increased demand in 10 of
the last 12 quarters, including 5% in the second quarter of this year.'" 9 3
Dairy producers pay assessments that add up to over 100 million
dollars a year for their nationally recognized celebrity "Got Milk?" campaign.194 Through this campaign, generic advertising has raised milk
sales an estimated 1.4 billion pounds, or 5.9%, between September of
1995 and August of 1996.' 9' Since the mandatory assessments in 1983,
milk sales are estimated to be 6%, or almost 16.9 billion pounds, above
what they would have been without the advertising. 96 Pork producers
pay into a regulatory program that yields about97$54 million per year for
their "The Other White Meat" advertisements.
The United decision therefore affects not only the mushroom industry but has implicated dozens of other agricultural promotional programs. 98 To prevent the destruction of these valuable generic advertising
programs, Congress will be forced to work harder to develop an assessment scheme that comports with the Court's decision.
CONCLUSION

The majority's refusal in United to adhere to precedent and extend to the mushroom advertising program the same level of deference
as other types of commercial speech took the Supreme Court's commercial speech jurisprudence in a mystifying and unfounded turn. The Court
should have applied the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test and
upheld the Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information
Act. Glickman is controlling and cannot reasonably be distinguished
191.
Steve Raabe, A Beef: It's What Ranchers Have With Ads, DENVER POST, July
20, 2001 at C-01.
192.
See Rod Smith, Industry Officials See Domino Effect, FEEDSTUFFS, August 13,
2001 at 1.
193.
Id.
194.
Anne Gearan, Mandatory Ad Campaigns Violate First Amendment,
CHATTANOOGA TIMES, June 26, 2001 at B5.
195.
Noel Blisard, et al., Evaluation of Fluid Milk and Cheese Advertising from
1984-1996, ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (December 1997), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/summaries/tbl860.htm
(last visited Oct. 7, 2001).
196.

Id.

197.

Paul Souhrada, New Ad Campaign being pitched to Ohio Farmers, THE

COLUMBUS DISPATCH,

198.

Feb. 27, 2001 at IC.

See, supra notes 191-97, and accompanying text.
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from United. The concept that a mandatory assessment program within a
more comprehensively regulated industry will pass constitutional muster,
while a similar program in a less comprehensively regulated industry
will not, is absurd. The effect of this decision will be felt throughout the
agricultural industry, as many programs will be forced to do away with
generic advertising or the government will have to develop a more intrusive regulatory program to include generic advertising in marketing orders.
LAURA JACKSON
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